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I. Introduction 
 
 On July 1, 2013, Tennessee Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 36.1 went into effect. 1  The stated purpose for 
Rule 36.1 was straightforward: “to provide a mechanism for 
the defendant or the State to seek to correct an illegal 
sentence.”2  To further effectuate that purpose, Tennessee 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 was also amended to reflect 
the right of a defendant or the State to appeal an adverse Rule 
36.1 ruling.3 Both purposes were designed to correct flaws 
in the prior methods used to correct illegal sentences.4 But 
then something strange happened. By late August of 2015, 
there had been over seventy-five opinions filed by the 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals dealing with Rule 36.1 
motions.5 Most of these Rule 36.1 motions were “filed by 
inmates in state or federal custody” long after the challenged 
sentences “should have been fully served.”6 Most of these 
cases involved claims “of an illegal concurrent sentence.”7 
Why were large numbers of prisoners filing to correct illegal 
                                                 
1 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1 (2013) (amended 2016). 
2 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1 (2013), Advisory Comm’n Cmt. (amended 
2016). 
3 Id. 
4 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2015) (noting 
that prior to the enactment of Rule 36.1 the State “had no mechanism for 
seeking to correct illegal sentences”); State v. Moody, 160 S.W.3d 512, 
516 (Tenn. 2005) (noting that direct appeal was not authorized for the 
dismissal of a common law motion to correct an illegal sentence). 
5 State v. Taylor, NO. W2014-02446-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 Tenn. Crim. 
App. LEXIS 849, at *29–30 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2015) 
(Holloway, J., concurring). 
6 Id. at *30. 
7 Id. 
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sentences that were shorter than what had been statutorily 
mandated? 
 The answer to that question laid in subsection (c)(3) 
of the original text of Rule 36.1, which provided that if “the 
illegal sentence was entered pursuant to a plea agreement” 
and “the illegal provision was a material component of the 
plea agreement,” the trial court was required to give the 
defendant “an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea” and 
to reinstate the original charge against the defendant if the 
defendant chose to withdraw the plea. 8  Additionally, the 
original text of Rule 36.1 simply stated that an illegal 
sentence could be corrected “at any time.”9 Prisoners began 
challenging sentences that had long ago expired in hopes that 
they would be allowed to withdraw their pleas and, 
ultimately, nullify their convictions, which had been used to 
enhance other sentences. The floodgates had been opened. 
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals quickly 
fractured over how to interpret Rule 36.1. Some members of 
that court interpreted Rule 36.1 as allowing for the correction 
of an illegal sentence even after it had expired. 10  Other 
members of the court concluded that the doctrine of 
mootness prevented Rule 36.1 from being used to challenge 
                                                 
8 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2013) (amended 2016). This portion of 
Rule 36.1 reflects the long-standing case law in Tennessee that a 
defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea when an illegal sentence 
is “a material element” of the plea agreement. See, e.g., Summers v. 
State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 
871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). However, the inclusion of the ability to attack the 
underlying conviction in Rule 36.1 appears to be unique to Tennessee 
law. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 834 (2016) (noting that, 
generally, a motion to correct an illegal sentence “is not a vehicle for a 
collateral attack on a conviction” and that “the relief available . . . is 
correction of a sentence rather than reversal of a conviction”). 
9 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) (2013) (amended 2016). 
10 State v. Talley, NO. E2014-01313-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7366257, 
at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2014) (Woodall, P.J., concurring in the 
judgment) (stating that, to him, “‘at any time’ means what it says, 
whether before or after sentences have been fully served”). 
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an expired sentence. 11  In State v. Brown, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court rejected both of these interpretations and 
held that Rule 36.1 did not “expand the scope of relief 
available for illegal sentence claims” from what would have 
been available if such claims were brought in a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, did not “authorize the 
correction of expired illegal sentences.”12  In essence, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that Rule 36.1 
implicitly incorporated certain procedural requirements 
from the state’s habeas corpus law. With that, the floodgates 
were effectively closed. 
 This article will examine how the Tennessee 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Brown and its companion case, 
State v. Wooden,13 interpreted Rule 36.1 inconsistently with 
the principles of statutory construction and overlooked 
significant aspects of “the jurisprudential context from 
which Rule 36.1 developed.”14 Part II of this article will take 
a close look at Rule 36.1 and the reasoning of the Brown and 
Wooden opinions. Part III will examine the “jurisprudential 
context from which Rule 36.1 developed”15 and will discuss 
how it was actually much broader than described in Brown. 
Part IV will look at the plain language of Rule 36.1 and how 
it was inconsistent with the Court’s interpretation of the Rule 
in Brown. Part V will discuss how the definition of “illegal 
sentence” found in Rule 36.1 was not a definition exclusive 
to “the habeas corpus context”16 as was asserted in Brown 
and Wooden. Part VI will examine the potential 
“unconstitutional applications of Rule 36.1”17 described in 
Brown and how that concern did not apply to the facts at 
issue in Brown. Part VII will address the doctrine of 
                                                 
11 Id. at *3. 
12 479 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tenn. 2015). 
13 478 S.W.3d 585 (Tenn. 2015). 
14 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 209. 
17 Id. at 211. 
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mootness and how it, likewise, did not apply to the facts at 
issue in Brown. Part VIII will conclude the article by looking 
at the recent amendment of Rule 36.1 and how it will, for 
better or worse, bring the text of Rule 36.1 into agreement 
with the Brown and Wooden opinions. 
 
II. Rule 36.1, Brown, and Wooden 
 
A. Rule 36.1 
 
 The original text of Rule 36.1 provided that either the 
defendant or the State could, “at any time, seek the 
correction of an illegal sentence by filing a motion to correct 
an illegal sentence in the trial court in which the judgment of 
conviction was entered.” 18  An “illegal sentence” was 
defined for purposes of Rule 36.1 as a sentence “that is not 
authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly 
contravenes an applicable statute.”19 If the motion stated a 
“colorable claim” alleging an illegal sentence and the 
defendant was indigent, the original text of Rule 36.1 
required the trial court to appoint an attorney to represent the 
defendant. 20  The movant was required to “promptly 
provide[]” notice of the motion to the adverse party.21 The 
adverse party was given thirty days to file a written response 
to the motion, after which the trial court was required to 
“hold a hearing on the motion, unless all parties waive[d] the 
hearing.”22 
 Subsection (c) of the original text of Rule 36.1 
outlined the possible outcomes of a Rule 36.1 motion. If the 
trial court ultimately determined that the sentence was not 
                                                 
18 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) (2013) (amended 2016). 
19 Id. 
20 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(b) (2013) (amended 2016). 
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
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illegal, it was required to file an order denying the motion.23 
Should the trial court determine that the sentence was illegal 
but that it was not entered pursuant to a guilty plea, it was 
required to enter “an amended uniform judgment document” 
reflecting “the correct sentence.”24  If the illegal sentence 
was entered pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court was 
then required to determine whether the illegal sentence “was 
a material component of the plea agreement.”25 If the illegal 
sentence was not a material component of the plea 
agreement, the trial court was required to enter an amended 
judgment document reflecting the correct sentence. 26 
Conversely, if the illegal sentence was a material component 
of the plea agreement, the trial court was required to “give 
the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea,” 
and if the defendant so chose, to enter an order “reinstating 
the original charge against the defendant.” 27  Rule 36.1 
provided both the State and the defendant with the right to 
appeal from the trial court’s disposition of a Rule 36.1 
motion.28 
 
B. State v. Wooden 
 
 The Tennessee Supreme Court examined Rule 36.1 
for the first time in the companion cases of State v. Wooden29 
and State v. Brown.30 In Wooden, the defendant filed a Rule 
36.1 motion alleging that “the trial court increased his 
sentence above the statutory presumptive minimum sentence 
but failed to find enhancement factors justifying the 
                                                 
23 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(1) (2013) (amended 2016). 
24 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(2) (2013) (amended 2016). 
25 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2013) (amended 2016). 
26 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(4) (2013) (amended 2016). 
27 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2013) (amended 2016). 
28 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(d) (2013) (amended 2016). 
29 478 S.W.3d 585, 586 (Tenn. 2015). 
30 479 S.W.3d 200, 202 (Tenn. 2015). 
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increase.” 31  The State responded by arguing that the 
defendant’s “allegations were not sufficient to state a 
colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1.”32 In addressing 
Mr. Wooden’s argument on appeal, the court “determine[d] 
the meaning of two terms used in Rule 36.1—‘colorable 
claim’ and ‘illegal sentence.’”33   
 After noting that “Rule 36.1 does not define 
‘colorable claim,’”34 the court referred to the definition of 
the term used “for purposes of post-conviction relief . . . .”35 
Specifically, the court noted that “colorable claim" was 
defined in the post-conviction context as “a claim, in a 
petition for post-conviction relief, that, if taken as true, in the 
light most favorable to petitioner, would entitle petitioner to 
relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.”36 The court 
concluded that “the term has the same general meaning in 
both [post-conviction and Rule 36.1] contexts,” and held that 
“for purposes of Rule 36.1, . . . ‘colorable claim’ means a 
claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most 
favorable to the moving party, would entitle the moving 
party to relief under Rule 36.1.”37 
 With respect to the term “illegal sentence,” the court 
stated that the Rule 36.1 definition “mirror[ed] that 
[definition] adopted” in Cantrell v. Easterling, which 
“defin[ed] the term for purposes of habeas corpus petitions 
seeking correction of illegal sentences.”38  The court held 
that “the definition of ‘illegal sentence’ in Rule 36.1 . . . 
[was] coextensive with, and not broader than, the definition 
of the term in the habeas corpus context,” and that holding 
                                                 
31 Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 587. 
32 Id. at 589. 
33 Id. at 587. 
34 Id. at 592. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TENN. SUP. CT. R. 28, 
§ 2(H)). 
37 Id. at 593. 
38 Id. at 594. 
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otherwise would require it “to ignore the plain language of 
Rule 36.1 and of Cantrell.”39 The court ultimately concluded 
that Mr. Wooden’s allegations were “insufficient to state a 
colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1”40 because even if 
the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence, it was still 
“statutorily available for the offense of which he was 
convicted” and, therefore, not illegal.41 
 
C. State v. Brown 
 
In Brown, the defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion alleging: 
 
[T]hat his sentences [were] illegal because . . 
. the trial court failed to award him pretrial 
jail credit[,] . . . the trial court imposed six-
year sentences . . . when his plea agreement 
called for three-year sentences[,] . . . and[,] 
[like the defendant in Wooden,] the trial court 
imposed sentences above the presumptive 
statutory minimum . . . without finding 
enhancement factors.42 
 
In the Brown opinion, the court framed the issues as 
“whether Rule 36.1 expand[ed] the scope of relief available 
for illegal sentence claims . . . [to allow for] correction of 
expired illegal sentences,” and whether the failure to award 
pretrial jail credit was “a colorable claim for relief . . . under 
Rule 36.1.”43 
 Regarding the first issue, the State conceded that 
“Rule 36.1 [allowed for] the correction of expired illegal 
                                                 
39 Id. at 594–95. 
40 Id. at 596 (internal footnote omitted). 
41 Id. 
42  State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 202–03 (Tenn. 2015) (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
43 Id. at 205. 
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sentences” and agreed with Mr. Brown’s interpretation of 
Rule 36.1.44 The court began its analysis of the issue by 
noting that the same rules used to construe statutes are used 
in construing rules of procedure like Rule 36.1.45 In regard 
to interpreting procedural rules, the court stated that courts 
“need not look beyond the plain language [of the rule] to 
ascertain [its] meaning” if “the text is clear and unambiguous 
. . . .”46 Put another way, courts “are constrained . . . to 
construe the language [of a rule] in a way that is natural, 
ordinary, and unforced.”47 Additionally, courts “interpret a 
procedural rule in light of the law existing at the time the 
procedural rule was adopted.”48 In doing so, “courts may 
presume that the [drafter] knows the ‘state of the law.’”49 
After stating these rules, the court then reviewed “the 
development of Tennessee law regarding the correction of 
illegal sentences . . . .”50 
 The court noted that, generally, “a trial court’s 
judgment becomes final thirty days after entry . . . [or] upon 
[the] ‘entry of the order denying a new trial’” or another 
specified post-trial motion,51 and that “a trial court has no 
power to alter a final judgment.”52 The court also noted the 
exception to this rule recognized in the 1978 case State v. 
Burkhart, where the Tennessee Supreme Court “held that ‘a 
                                                 
44 Id. at 210. 
45 Id. at 205 (citing State v. Johnson, 342 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tenn. 2011)). 
46 Id. at 205 (citing Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 
(Tenn. 2010)). 
47 Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 808 (Tenn. 2015). 
48 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 205 (citing Beecher, 312 S.W.3d at 527). 
49 Beecher, 312 S.W.3d at 527 (quoting Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. 
v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2005)). 
50 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 205. 
51 Id. at 205–06 (quoting TENN. R. APP. P. 4(c)) (citing State v. Green, 
106 S.W.3d 646, 648–49 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Peele, 58 S.W.3d 701, 
704 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 
1996)). 
52 Id. at 206 (citing Green, 106 S.W.3d at 648–49; Peele, 58 S.W.3d at 
704; Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837). 
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trial judge may correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely 
erroneous, sentence at any time, even if it has become 
final.’”53 However, when the Tennessee Rules of Criminal 
Procedure became effective in 1979, they did not “specify 
any procedure for making such requests,” 54  and “the 
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which also became 
effective in 1979, did not authorize an appeal as of right from 
a trial court’s decision on a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence.” 55  Instead, defendants seeking to challenge an 
illegal sentence followed the procedure that was used in 
Burkhart, which was to file a motion to correct the illegal 
sentence in the trial court and then rely “upon the 
discretionary common law writ of certiorari to seek appellate 
review of trial court orders . . . .”56 
After reviewing the rule and procedure found in 
Burkhart, the court examined its 2005 opinion in Moody v. 
State and concluded that Moody reaffirmed “the rule 
announced in Burkhart—that an allegedly illegal sentence 
may be challenged at any time, even after it is final,” but that 
Moody rejected “the Burkhart procedure.” 57  The court 
quoted the holding in Moody, stating that “the proper 
procedure for challenging an illegal sentence at the trial level 
[was] through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the grant 
or denial of which [could] then be appealed under the Rules 
of Appellate Procedure.”58 In Brown, the court reasoned that 
                                                 
53 Id. (quoting State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978)). 
54 Id. (citing Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Tenn. 2011)). 
55 Id. at 206 (internal footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Moody, 160 
S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tenn. 2005)). 
56 Id. at 206 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 515). In fact, “[t]he common 
law writ of certiorari [is] codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 
27-8-101,” and is available when the trial court has acted “without legal 
authority and where no other ‘plain, speedy or adequate remedy’ is 
available.” Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-
8-101 (2000)) (citing State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tenn. 2002)). 
57 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 206 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516). 
58 Id. 
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“[b]y adopting habeas corpus as the mechanism for 
challenging illegal sentences, the Moody Court implicitly 
limited the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims to 
unexpired illegal sentences.”59 The court reasoned this was 
because habeas corpus relief is statutorily limited to persons 
“imprisoned or restrained of liberty” 60  and that it had 
previously held, in the habeas corpus context, that “[u]se of 
the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on 
a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to 
permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction 
long after the sentence on the original conviction has 
expired.”61 
 The Brown opinion asserted that it was “[a]gainst this 
jurisprudential backdrop” that Rule 36.1 was adopted.62 The 
court then turned to the text of Rule 36.1, noting that Rule 
36.1 differed “from the procedure applicable to habeas 
corpus petitions challenging illegal sentences” in that it 
allowed the State to seek correction of an illegal sentence 
and that the motion was to be filed in the trial court where 
the judgment of conviction was entered rather than the 
county where the defendant was incarcerated.63 The court 
asserted that Rule 36.1 was “identical to habeas corpus in 
other respects” but cited only its conclusion in Wooden to 
support the proposition that definition of “illegal sentence” 
in Rule 36.1 was “coextensive with, and actually mirror[ed], 
the definition [the] Court [had] applied to that term in the 
habeas corpus context.”64 
 The court also reasoned that the phrase “at any time” 
had “no bearing on whether Rule 36.1 authorizes relief from 
                                                 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 206–07 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-21-101(a) (2012)). 
61  Id. at 207 (quoting Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tenn. 
2004)). 
62 Id. at 208. 
63 Id. at 209 (quoting TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)). 
64 Id. at 209 (citing State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585 (Tenn. 2015)). 
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expired illegal sentences.”65 Instead, the court asserted that 
the phrase was designed to convey that illegal sentences 
could be challenged even after the judgment became final 
and that, like habeas corpus petitions, Rule 36.1 motions 
were “not subject to any statute of limitations.”66 The court 
further asserted that the phrase “at any time” “simply [did] 
not answer the question of whether Rule 36.1 permit[ed] the 
correction of expired illegal sentences” because “the text of 
Rule 36.1 [was] silent” on this point.67 The court admitted 
that “one possible interpretation of this silence [was] that 
Rule 36.1 authorize[d] the correction of expired illegal 
sentences . . . .” 68  However, the court rejected this 
interpretation, finding that it was “not reasonable in light of 
the expressed purpose of Rule 36.1, its language, and the 
jurisprudential background from which it developed.”69 
The court then reasoned that 
 
Rule 36.1 was adopted “to provide a 
mechanism for the defendant or the State to 
seek to correct an illegal sentence.” Neither 
the comments to Rule 36.1 nor its text 
suggest that it was intended to expand the 
scope of relief available on such claims by 
permitting the correction of expired illegal 
sentences. Had such an expansion been 
intended, Rule 36.1 would have almost 
certainly included language clearly 
expressing that intent, given its inconsistency 
with this Court’s prior decisions refusing to 
grant habeas corpus relief for expired illegal 
sentences. That Rule 36.1 was not, in fact, 
                                                 
65 Id. at 210. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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intended to expand the scope of relief for 
illegal sentence claims is evidenced by the 
portion of Rule 36.1 defining “illegal 
sentence” exactly as this Court had already 
defined that term in the habeas corpus 
context.70 
 
 The court also asserted that interpreting Rule 36.1 to 
allow for the correction of expired sentences could 
“potentially produce absurd, and even arguably 
unconstitutional, results.”71  The court argued that if Rule 
36.1 allowed the State to correct an illegally lenient sentence 
after it had been served, defendants would likely argue that 
such an action would violate constitutional protections 
against double jeopardy. 72  The court concluded that the 
“outcry would be unimaginable” if the State were to “start 
using Rule 36.1 to jail untold numbers of citizens that by all 
indications [had] completely served their sentences. . . .”73 
As such, the court held “that Rule 36.1 [did] not expand the 
scope of relief [from what was available in a habeas corpus 
proceeding] and [did] not authorize the correction of expired 
illegal sentences.”74 
 In so holding, the court rejected the argument 
propounded by some members of the Tennessee Court of 
Criminal Appeals that claims regarding expired sentences 
were moot. The Court noted that in the habeas corpus 
context, a challenged conviction’s “collateral consequences 
may prevent a habeas corpus petition from becoming moot,” 
but the fact that the claim is not moot does not mean that it 
                                                 
70 Id. at 210–11 (internal citation omitted) (quoting TENN. R. CRIM. P. 
36.1, Advisory Comm’n Cmt.). 
71 Id. at 211. 
72 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Selavka, 14 N.E.3d 933, 941 (2014)). 
73 Id. at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lee v. State, NO. 
W2014-00994-CCA-R3-CO, 2015 WL 2330063, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. May 13, 2015) (Williams, J., dissenting)). 
74 Id. at 211. 
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will fall “within the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction.”75 
Because the court had interpreted Rule 36.1 as implicitly 
limiting the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims to 
unexpired illegal sentences, the court concluded that 
“[c]ollateral consequences may prevent a case from 
becoming moot in the traditional sense of the mootness 
doctrine, but Rule 36.1 [was] not an appropriate avenue for 
seeking relief from collateral consequences.”76 
 The court then examined the issue of whether failure 
to award pretrial jail credit was a colorable claim for Rule 
36.1 relief and held it was not.77 The court concluded its 
opinion by addressing Mr. Brown’s claim that the trial court 
erroneously imposed six-year sentences rather than three-
year sentences as provided by the plea agreement. 78  The 
court concluded that the mistake was a mere clerical error 
that could be corrected pursuant to Tennessee Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 36.79 Rule 36 also contained the phrase 
“at any time.” The court reasoned that “[p]ermitting 
correction of the clerical error pursuant to Rule 36 despite 
the expiration of [the] sentence [did] not contravene [its] 
                                                 
75 Id. at 211–12 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting May v. 
Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 356 (Tenn. 2008) (Koch, J., dissenting)). 
76 Id. at 212 n.12. 
77 Id. at 212–13. The court did so despite the fact that the awarding of 
pretrial jail credits is statutorily mandated. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-
101(c) (2012). The court reasoned that pretrial jail credits did not alter 
the sentence itself; rather, they merely affected “the length of time a 
defendant is incarcerated.” Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 212. The court 
concluded, therefore, that the denial of pretrial jail credits could never 
render a sentence illegal. Id. at 213. Instead, a trial court’s failure to 
award pretrial jail credits could be challenged on direct appeal. Id. at 
212–13. It remains to be seen whether this holding forecloses post-
conviction or habeas corpus relief for defendants erroneously deprived 
of pretrial jail credits or is merely limited to Rule 36.1 relief.  
78 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 213. 
79 Id.; see also TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36 (stating that a trial court “may at 
any time correct clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of 
the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission”). 
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principal holding that Rule 36.1 [did] not authorize courts to 
grant relief from expired illegal sentences.” 80  The court 
further reasoned that “[c]orrecting clerical errors so that the 
record accurately reflects the sentence imposed [did] not 
amount to granting relief from expired illegal sentences.”81 
As such, the court remanded the case to the trial court for 
correction of the clerical error pursuant to Rule 36.82 
 
III. “Jurisprudential Context” of Rule 36.1 
 
A. Common Law Motions to Correct Illegal Sentences 
 
 As noted in Part II, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
first dealt with the issue of a trial court’s inherent power to 
correct illegal sentences in the 1978 case of State v. 
Burkhart.83 At issue in Burkhart was the trial court’s failure 
to order, as mandated by statute, two sentences to be served 
consecutively.84 Mr. Burkhart was convicted of “burglary in 
the first degree,” escaped from prison, was subsequently 
convicted for the escape, and sentenced to one year in prison 
running from the day of his conviction.85 When the State 
Department of Correction realized that this, in effect, would 
allow the prisoner to serve his two sentences concurrently 
(contrary to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-3802), it 
notified the prisoner that he would have to serve his sentence 
for the escape after his sentence for burglary concluded.86 
Mr. Burkart petitioned the trial court to prevent the State 
Department of Corrections from altering the terms of his 
sentence; however, the trial court, realizing its mistake, 
                                                 
80 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 213. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1978). 
84 Id. at 872. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
15
et al.: Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1's New Clothes
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2017
Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
[48] 
denied the petition.87  On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court held that the trial court had the inherent power to 
correct the defendant’s illegal sentence, stating that “the 
judgment entered in the trial court . . . was in direct 
contravention of the express provisions of [a statute], and 
consequently was a nullity.”88 The court further stated that 
“the trial judge . . . had both the power, and the duty, to 
correct the judgment . . . as soon as its illegality was brought 
to his attention.”89 The court held that “[a]s a general rule, a 
trial judge may correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely 
erroneous, sentence at any time, even if it has become 
final.”90 
 In Burkhart, the court did not state its rationale for 
holding that a trial court could correct an illegal sentence. 
However, the court did cite to several cases from other 
jurisdictions that establish the source of a trial court’s power 
to correct illegal sentences.91 In State v. Culver, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court stated that a trial court’s “power to 
punish criminal offenders . . . would seem naturally to 
include the power to correct the sentences imposed by it.”92 
The New Jersey Supreme Court then held that when a trial 
court has imposed an illegal sentence “the court’s 
jurisdiction to impose a correct sentence [would not expire] 
until a valid sentence was imposed.”93 Likewise, the Iowa 
Supreme Court held in State v. Shilinsky that “[u]ntil a valid 
judgment [is] entered, the [trial] court [does] not exhaust its 
jurisdiction, and might be required to correct any 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 873. 
89 Id. 
90  Id. (citing State v. Leathers, 531 P.2d 901 (Or. 1975); Frazier v. 
Langlois, 240 A.2d 152 (R.I. 1968); State v. Fountaine, 430 P.2d 235 
(Kan. 1967); In re Sandel, 412 P.2d 806 (Cal. 1966); State v. Shilisnky, 
81 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1957); State v. Culver, 129 A.2d 715 (N.J. 1957)). 
91 Id.  
92 Culver, 129 A.2d at 720. 
93 Id. at 724. 
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irregularities by pronouncing a valid sentence and entering a 
valid judgment.”94 This is so because, as noted by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in State v. Fountaine, “a void sentence in 
contemplation of law is non-existent.”95 Therefore, as held 
by the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Leathers, a trial 
court that has imposed an illegal sentence “has not exhausted 
its jurisdiction [because] it has in fact failed to pronounce 
any sentence.”96 This reasoning regarding illegal sentences 
was in line with Tennessee case law of the time, which 
maintained that “where a judgment is void then there is no 
judgment and consequently the [trial] court does not lose 
jurisdiction over the matter.”97 Yet, the court’s opinion in 
Brown made no mention of these cases in its discussion of 
the jurisprudential context of Rule 36.1. 
 
B. Illegal Sentence Claims in the Years Between 
Burkhart and Moody 
 
 In the years following Burkhart, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court, on at least two occasions in State v. Mahler98 
                                                 
94  Shilinsky, 81 N.W.2d at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Nelson v. Foley, 223 N.W. 323, 324 (S.D. 1929)). 
95  Fountaine, 430 P.2d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Howell, 103 F. Supp. 714, 718 (S.D.W. Va. 
1952)). 
96 State v. Leathers, 531 P.2d 901, 303 (Or. 1975) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Nelson, 424 P.2d 223, 225 (Or. 1967)). 
97 Tennessee ex rel. Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tenn. 
1951). This reasoning was also in line with the purpose of the original 
text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which provided that a 
federal district court could “correct an illegal sentence at any time.”  See 
United States v. James, 709 F.2d 298, 307–08 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting 
that Rule 35 was designed to continue the existing decisional law which 
recognized that a district court’s power to correct an illegal sentence 
“sprang from the court’s want of jurisdiction to impose [an] illegal 
sentence in the first place”). 
98 State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987). 
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and McConnell v. State,99 addressed illegal sentence claims 
that had been raised as part of a petition for post-conviction 
relief. Again, the Brown opinion made no reference to these 
cases in its discussion of the jurisprudential context of Rule 
36.1. Meanwhile, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals 
was more vexed by the question of how to procedurally treat 
a motion to correct an illegal sentence. For example, in State 
v. Reliford, 100  a panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals 
addressed a defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s 
dismissal of his motion to correct his sentences. 101  The 
Reliford opinion noted that there was no direct appeal as of 
right from the trial court’s dismissal.102 However, citing the 
holding of Burkhart, the panel reasoned that “[l]ogic 
dictate[d] that some avenue of appeal [lay] from an adverse 
ruling of the trial court” and elected to treat the defendant’s 
appeal as a common law petition for writ of certiorari.103 
Citing to Mahler and McConnell, the panel concluded that 
the defendant’s sentence was illegal. 104  Specifically, the 
panel noted that “[s]entencing is jurisdictional and must be 
executed in compliance with the applicable legislative 
mandates” and that trial courts lack “the statutory authority 
to impose a sentence . . . that deviate[s] from the penalties 
proscribed by law.”105 
In an opinion filed eleven days after Reliford, a 
separate panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that 
“the appropriate procedure for challenging a void sentence 
                                                 
99 McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 796 (Tenn. 2000). 
100  State v. Reliford, NO. W1999-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 
1473846 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2000). 
101 Id. at *1. 
102 Id. at *2. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (quoting State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987)). 
105 Id. at *2 (citing McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 798–800 (Tenn. 
2000)). 
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is a petition for habeas corpus relief.”106 The panel reasoned 
that a petition for habeas corpus relief is “the appropriate 
procedure” because “[i]n cases arising from criminal 
convictions, the remedy of habeas corpus relief applies when 
the judgment is void.”107 However, the panel then stated that 
“because an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, 
[it did] not believe that the defendant’s failure to seek habeas 
corpus relief necessarily deprive[d] him of appellate 
review.”108 Citing to Reliford, the panel concluded that a 
defendant could “pursue appellate review from the denial of 
a motion to correct an illegal sentence through the common 
law writ of certiorari.”109 The panel ultimately declined to 
grant the defendant an appeal after concluding, on the merits, 
that his sentence was not illegal.110 
Less than a year later, in April 2001, a third panel of 
the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the procedural 
nature of illegal sentence claims in a published opinion,111 
Cox v. State.112 In outlining its analysis of the issue, the Cox 
opinion stated that 
 
                                                 
106 State v. Jones, NO. M2000-00381-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1520012, 
at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2000) (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 
S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2000)). The long-standing rule in 
Tennessee is that “the writ of habeas corpus will issue only in the case 
of a void judgment or to free a prisoner after his term of imprisonment 
or other restraint has expired.” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 
(Tenn. 2007) (citing Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992)). 
107  Jones, 2000 WL 1520012, at *2 (citing Passarella v. State, 891 
S.W.2d 619, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 
157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)). 
108 Id. at *2. 
109 Id. (citing State v. Reliford, NO. W1999-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 
WL 1473846, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2000)). 
110 Id. at *3–4. 
111 Published opinions are controlling authority in Tennessee state courts 
until they are reversed or modified by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 4(G)(2). 
112 53 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). 
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[t]he key to analyzing these collateral attacks 
on sentences is to appreciate that the phrase 
“illegal sentence” as used in our caselaw [sic] 
is a term of art that refers to sentences 
imposed by a court that is acting beyond its 
jurisdiction—that is to say, sentences that 
result from void judgments. The upshot of 
our analysis [would] be that habeas corpus is 
the preferred, if not the only, method of 
collaterally attacking void sentences and that 
collateral attacks that assert lesser claims of 
merely erroneous or voidable sentences are 
generally doomed, unless by nature they fit 
within some other recognized form of 
action.113 
 
This panel reasoned that “[t]he distinction made in Mahler 
and Burkhart between erroneous, voidable sentences . . . and 
illegal or void sentences . . . call[ed] to mind the scope of the 
writ of habeas corpus” and that “the phrase ‘illegal sentence’ 
[was] synonymous with the habeas corpus concept of a 
‘void’ sentence.” 114  Noting that “a claim that merely 
assert[ed] a void sentence, even though it may not assert a 
void conviction, [was] cognizable as a habeas corpus 
proceeding,” the panel concluded that “the better method of 
challenging illegal or void sentences [was] via an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus.”115 The panel further noted that 
“illegal or void sentence claims” sounding in a habeas 
corpus proceeding would “be subject to dismissal [for] 
fail[ing] to meet the procedural requirements” of such a 
                                                 
113 Id. at 291. 
114 Id. at 291–92 (citing Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 
1993)). 
115 Cox, 53 S.W.3d at 292 (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 
911 (Tenn. 2000)). 
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proceeding.116 However, the panel recognized that an illegal 
sentence claim could be brought in a petition for post-
conviction relief. 117  Likewise, the panel recognized that, 
while they should “rarely be granted,” appeals via the 
common law writ of certiorari were available for claims that 
rose “to the level of illegality or voidness.”118 
 
C. Habeas Corpus Cases 
 
 It was against this backdrop that the Tennessee 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Moody v. State. In 
Brown, it is asserted that Moody stands as a rejection of “the 
Burkhart procedure” because “[b]y adopting habeas corpus 
as the mechanism for challenging illegal sentences, the 
Moody court implicitly limited the scope of relief for illegal 
sentence claims to unexpired illegal sentences.” 119 
Underpinning the Brown court’s reasoning is the assumption 
that Moody adopted habeas corpus as the exclusive 
procedural vehicle for challenging illegal sentences. 
However, a close reading of Moody indicates that may not 
be true.  
The court in Moody took the “opportunity to clarify 
the proper procedure for seeking review of illegal sentence 
claims at both the trial level and on appeal.”120 The court 
held that the Cox opinion’s “reliance on Burkhart as 
supporting certiorari review of the denial of a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence [was] misplaced” because 
Burkhart was decided prior to the adoption of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which were “intended to replace the 
appellate court procedure that was governed by scattered 
provisions of the Tennessee Code and the rules and decisions 
                                                 
116 Id. at 293. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 294. 
119 State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 206 (Tenn. 2015). 
120 State v. Moody, 160 S.W.3d 512, 515 (Tenn. 2005). 
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of the appellate courts.” 121  Noting that the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure did not “authorize a direct appeal of a 
dismissal of a motion to correct an illegal sentence[,]” 
Moody  clarified “that the proper procedure for challenging 
an illegal sentence at the trial level [was] through a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus, the grant or denial of which 
[could] then be appealed under the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.”122  The fact that the summary dismissal of a 
habeas corpus petition could be challenged on appeal was 
one of the key factors in the court’s holding. The court 
further clarified that because a defendant could use a habeas 
corpus proceeding to challenge an illegal sentence, “the writ 
of certiorari [was] not available to review an illegal sentence 
claim that [had] been presented through a motion.”123 
However, in so holding, the court noted that “[a] void 
or illegal sentence also [could] be challenged collaterally in 
a post-conviction proceeding when the statutory 
requirements are met.”124 Concluding the opinion, the court 
restated its holding that “[a] habeas corpus action [was] the 
proper procedure for collaterally challenging an illegal 
sentence,” but then stated that “[a]lthough a trial court may 
correct an illegal sentence at any time, appellate courts may 
not review the denial of a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence through the common law writ of certiorari.” 125 
These two aspects of the Moody opinion were not mentioned 
                                                 
121 Id. at 516 (citing State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 
1978)). 
122 Id. at 516 (emphasis added) (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 
910, 912 (Tenn. 2000)). 
123 Id. at 516 (citing State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tenn. 2002)). 
124 Id. at 516 n.2 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 
226, 228 (Tenn. 1987)). Post-conviction relief is available “when the 
conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of 
any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution 
of the United States.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-103 (2012). 
125 Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516 (emphasis added). 
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by the court in Brown.126 Contrary to the assertion in Brown 
that Moody established habeas corpus as the sole procedural 
vehicle for challenging an illegal sentence, Moody directly 
stated that illegal sentences could be challenged in a post-
conviction proceeding as well as a habeas corpus 
proceeding.127 Furthermore, Moody also directly stated that, 
while there was no method for direct appeal from a motion 
to correct an illegal sentence, trial courts continued to retain 
their inherent power to correct an illegal sentence at any 
time.128   
Two years after Moody, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court addressed whether an expired illegal sentence could 
be challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding in Summers v. 
State.129 The court began its analysis by restating the rule 
that “[a] sentence imposed in direct contravention of a 
statute is void and illegal.”130 The court then declared that 
“[a] trial court may correct an illegal or void sentence at any 
time” before reaffirming the holding of Moody that “[a] 
habeas corpus petition, rather than a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence, is the proper procedure for challenging an 
illegal sentence.”131 However, in restating these principles, 
the court again noted that an illegal sentence could also be 
challenged in a post-conviction proceeding “when the 
statutory requirements are met, including the one-year 
limitations period.”132  
The Summers court then addressed the question of 
whether an expired illegal sentence could be challenged in a 
habeas corpus proceeding. 133  The court noted that a 
                                                 
126 See State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 206 (Tenn. 2015). 
127 Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516. 
128 Id. 
129 Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007). 
130 Id. (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000)). 
131 Id. at 256 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516). 
132 Id. at 256 n.3 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a) (2006); State 
v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987)). 
133 Id. at 257.  
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petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief must be “imprisoned 
or restrained of liberty.”134 Such status has been deemed “[a] 
statutory prerequisite for eligibility to seek habeas corpus 
relief . . . .” 135  The court explained that the term 
“imprisoned” in the habeas corpus statutes referred “to 
actual physical confinement or detention.” 136  The court 
further explained that “restrained of liberty” was “a broader 
term and encompass[ed] situations beyond actual physical 
custody[,]” but only if “the challenged judgment itself 
impose[d] a restraint on the petitioner’s freedom of action or 
movement.” 137  As such, the court concluded that habeas 
corpus relief would not lie “to address a conviction after the 
sentence on the conviction [had] been fully served.” 138 
However, the court ultimately determined this rule did not 
bar Mr. Summers’s petition because his total effective 
sentence had not been served and had not expired.139   
In the years following Summers, the court in Cantrell 
v. Easterling140 “returned to the topic of illegal sentences [to] 
provide a more comprehensive analysis of sentencing errors 
and a more general definition of illegal sentences.” 141 
Cantrell will be discussed in more detail later in this article, 
but for purposes of this section it is important to note that in 
Cantrell the court again stated that a defendant could 
challenge an illegal sentence in a post-conviction proceeding 
“when the statutory requirements are met.” 142  The 
                                                 
134 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 
29-21-101 (2000)). 
135 Benson v. State, 153 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Tenn. 2004). 
136 Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 257 (citing Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 
16, 22 (Tenn. 2004)). 
137 Id. (citing Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 22). 
138 Id. (citing Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23–24). 
139 Id. at 258. 
140 Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 445 (Tenn. 2011). 
141 State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Cantrell, 
346 S.W.3d at 448–55). 
142 Id. at 453 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. 
Moody, 160 S.W.3d 512, 516 n.2 (Tenn. 2005)). 
24
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol12/iss1/3
Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
[57] 
statements in Summers and Cantrell demonstrate that, even 
after the court in Moody found that habeas corpus was the 
“proper procedure” for challenging an illegal sentence, the 
court continued to recognize the availability of post-
conviction proceedings to challenge an illegal sentence.143 
More recently, the court in State v. Brown discussed the 
details of Moody,144 Summers,145 and Cantrell146 at length, 
but it made no mention of the fact that all three opinions 
contained similar statements to that effect. 
The court’s reasoning in Brown, maintaining that 
“the Moody Court implicitly limited the scope of relief for 
illegal sentence claims to unexpired illegal sentences[,]”147 
is highly questionable in light of the fact that the Moody, 
Summer, and Cantrell decisions never adopted habeas 
corpus proceedings as the exclusive mechanism for 
challenging an illegal sentence. Habeas corpus and post-
conviction have long been recognized as the “two primary 
procedural avenues available in Tennessee to collaterally 
attack a conviction and sentence which have become 
final.”148 The Tennessee Supreme Court “[has] rejected and 
will continue to reject efforts to intertwine the two 
procedures.”149 For example, the court held in Taylor v. State 
that “the statute of limitations for filing post-conviction 
petitions in no way precludes the filing of petitions for 
habeas corpus which contest void judgments.”150 Similarly, 
in Summers, the court “declin[ed] to incorporate the liberal 
procedural safeguards of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
                                                 
143 Id. at 206 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 207. 
146 Id. at 208. 
147 Id. at 206. 
148 Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Potts v. State, 
833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that “[t]hese procedural 
vehicles are theoretically and statutorily distinct.”). 
149 Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007). 
150 Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 84. 
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into the provisions governing habeas corpus.”151 Rather than 
habeas corpus being the only method to challenge an illegal 
sentence, as implied in the Brown opinion, there were at least 
two separate and distinct procedural vehicles to challenge an 
illegal sentence during the time between the Moody decision 
and the enactment of Rule 36.1. 
 
D. Post-Conviction Proceedings and Expired Sentences 
 
In addition to the fact that habeas corpus was not the 
sole mechanism for challenging an illegal sentence, a 
separate factor, related to the ability to challenge an illegal 
sentence via a post-conviction proceeding as stated in 
Moody, Summers, and Cantrell, undermines the court’s 
reasoning in Brown that “the Moody Court implicitly limited 
the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims to unexpired 
illegal sentences.”152 In 1977, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
held in State v. McCraw that the term “in custody” found in 
the Post-Conviction Relief Act meant “any possibility of 
restraint on liberty.” 153  The court then reiterated several 
factors concerning the mootness of a habeas petition post-
conviction, including the possibility that a conviction could 
be used in the future to prevent a defendant from engaging 
“in certain businesses,” losing the right to vote, losing the 
ability to serve as a juror, and the possibility that the 
conviction “could impeach the petitioner’s character at any 
future criminal trial or be used as a basis for infliction of 
greater punishment on [the] petitioner.”154  
                                                 
151 Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261. 
152 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 206 (emphasis in original). 
153 State v. McCraw, 551 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1977). 
154 Id. (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968); Sibron v. 
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55–56 (1965)); see also Hickman v. State, 153 
S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tenn. 2004) (narrowing the definition of “restrained of 
liberty” to situations where “the challenged judgment itself imposes a 
restraint upon the petitioner’s freedom of action or movement.”); Joshua 
Kaiser, Revealing the Hidden Sentence: How to Add Transparency, 
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In 1991, the court declined the State’s “invitation to 
reverse McCraw.”155 Shortly after that, a panel of Tennessee 
Court of Criminal Appeals stated that McCraw stood for the 
proposition “that one may file a post-conviction petition, 
even after fully serving a sentence, as long as the petitioner 
remain[ed] subject to collateral legal consequences due to 
the challenged conviction.”156 In fact, the Tennessee Court 
of Criminal Appeals has reviewed the denial of post-
conviction relief because the petitioner’s prior sentences had 
been used to enhance his current sentence for a federal 
conviction even though the challenged sentences expired 
over ten years prior to its review.157 The Tennessee Court of 
Criminal Appeals has recognized as recently as 2015 that “a 
petition for post-conviction relief [was] permitted to attack 
collaterally an expired sentence when ‘the challenged 
conviction [was] used to enhance punishment.’”158 
More importantly, the Tennessee Supreme Court in 
State v. Hickman recognized that “the language ‘imprisoned 
or restrained of liberty’ used in . . . the habeas corpus 
statue[s] was not co-extensive with the ‘person in custody’ 
                                                 
Legitimacy, and Purpose to “Collateral” Punishment Policy, 10 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 163 (2016) (analyzing the NICCC data and finding 
that Tennessee has 888 “post-release hidden” sentencing laws, fifty-eight 
percent of which have mandatory or automatic execution and eighty-
three percent of which remain in effect for the remainder of the 
defendant’s life). Based on these findings, perhaps it is time to reexamine 
the issue of whether collateral consequences of a conviction can justify 
a habeas corpus challenge even after the conviction has “expired” given 
the life-long effects and voluminous number of collateral consequences 
in this state. Such a question, however, is beyond the scope of this article.  
155 Albert v. State, 813 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tenn. 1991). 
156 State v. Clemons, 873 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). 
157  Tyrice L. Sawyers, NO. M2007-02867-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 
5424031, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 31, 2008). 
158  Massengill v. State, NO. E2015-00501-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL 
7259279, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 2015) (quoting State v. 
McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tenn. 1987)). 
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language of the [post-conviction statutes].” 159  The court 
reaffirmed that the term “in custody” “has long been broadly 
construed to permit persons to collaterally challenge, by 
means of a post-conviction petition, a judgment of 
conviction that later may be used to enhance a sentence on 
another conviction,” and that “[s]uch challenges have been 
allowed even if the sentence on the challenged conviction 
has been served or has expired at the time of the post-
conviction petition is filed.” 160  The Brown court cited 
Hickman for the proposition that “habeas corpus relief may 
not be granted after [the] expiration of a sentence,”161 but the 
court’s discussion did not refer to Hickman’s statement that 
a petitioner “may be ‘in custody’ for purposes of the Post-
Conviction Procedure Act, but he is neither ‘imprisoned’ nor 
‘restrained of liberty’ for purposes of seeking habeas corpus 
relief.”162 Similarly, the Brown court did not discuss the fact 
that an expired sentence could be collaterally challenged in 
a post-conviction proceeding. 
Until Brown, the court had never held that habeas 
corpus was the exclusive procedural vehicle to challenge an 
illegal sentence; instead, the court had consistently 
recognized two separate and distinct procedural mechanisms 
for challenging illegal sentences. In habeas corpus 
proceedings, the statutory pleading requirements “are 
mandatory and must be followed scrupulously.” 163  Post-
conviction proceedings, on the other hand, have much more 
“liberal procedural safeguards”164 and defendants can use 
them to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence even 
after the sentence has expired—the exact type of claims 
                                                 
159 Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23 n.4. 
160 Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. McCraw, 551 S.W.2d 692, 694 
(Tenn. 1977)). 
161 State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tenn. 2015). 
162 Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23 n.4. 
163 Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 165 (Tenn. 1993). 
164 Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007). 
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brought in the flood of Rule 36.1 litigation.165 This weakens 
the court’s reasoning in Brown that Rule 36.1 did “not 
expand the scope of relief [beyond that which is available in 
a habeas corpus proceeding] and [did] not authorize the 
correction of expired illegal sentences.”166 The drafters of 
Rule 36.1 were presumed to know this “‘state of the law’” 
when drafting Rule 36.1,167 but the Brown court overlooked 
a significant portion “of the law existing at the time” Rule 
36.1 was adopted. 168  With this jurisprudential context in 
mind, this article now turns to the text of Rule 36.1. 
 
IV. Plain Language of Rule 36.1 
 
While admitting that the view that Rule 36.1 
authorized “the correction of expired illegal sentences” was 
                                                 
165  Admittedly, it would be difficult to challenge an expired illegal 
sentence in a post-conviction setting due to the one-year statute of 
limitations. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a) (2012). The challenge 
would have to involve a misdemeanor sentence or the petition would 
have to show a statutory or due process reason for tolling the statute of 
limitations. Id. § 40-30-102(b) (listing the statutory bases for tolling the 
statute of limitations); Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 23 (Tenn. 2014) 
(listing instances where the Tennessee Supreme Court has tolled the 
post-conviction statute of limitations on due process grounds). 
Additionally, the case law is unclear as to exactly what constitutional 
right is at issue when an illegal sentence is challenged in a post-
conviction proceeding. Mahler and McConnell address alleged illegal 
sentences in the post-conviction context without addressing this issue. In 
at least one opinion, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that, 
in the context of a guilty plea, failure to inform the petitioner he was 
agreeing to an illegal sentence constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel which caused the defendant to unknowingly and involuntarily 
enter into a guilty plea. See, e.g., Meriweather v. State, NO. M2008-
02329-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 27947, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 
2010). 
166 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211. 
167 Lee Med., Inc., v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010) (citing 
Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 
2005)). 
168 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 205. 
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“one possible interpretation,” the court in Brown rejected 
that interpretation as unreasonable “in light of the expressed 
purpose of Rule 36.1, its language, and the jurisprudential 
background from which it developed.”169 In looking at the 
text of Rule 36.1, the court stated that the phrase “at any 
time,” as used in Rule 36.1, had “no bearing” on the issue of 
whether Rule 36.1 authorized the correction of expired 
illegal sentences.170 Instead, the court argued that the phrase 
“at any time” simply meant (1) that an illegal sentence could 
be corrected after it became final and (2) that there was no 
statute of limitations on Rule 36.1 motions. 171  Also, in 
looking at the text of Rule 36.1, the court stated that the rule 
differed “from the procedure applicable to habeas corpus 
petitions challenging illegal sentences” in “at least two 
ways.” First, the rule allowed the State to challenge an illegal 
sentence. Second, it required the motion to be filed in the 
trial court where the judgment of conviction was entered 
rather than the county where the petitioner was 
incarcerated. 172  Finally, the court reasoned that, had the 
drafters of Rule 36.1 intended for it to differ from the court’s 
“prior decisions refusing to grant habeas corpus relief for 
expired illegal sentences,” they “almost certainly” would 
have “included language clearly expressing that intent . . . 
.”173   
 The court’s reasoning in Brown regarding the phrase 
“at any time” has led one Tennessee Court of Criminal 
Appeals judge to question how that term could “mean one 
thing in the text of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 
and yet mean an entirely different thing in the text of Rule 
36.1?” 174  The court concluded at the end of the Brown 
                                                 
169 Id. at 210. 
170 Id.  
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 209. 
173 Id. at 211. 
174  State v. Bennett, NO. E2015-00510-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 
8773599, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2015) (Witt, J., concurring). 
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opinion that Rule 36, addressing clerical errors, did apply to 
expired sentences because Rule 36 did not “authorize courts 
to grant relief from expired illegal sentences.”175 However, 
nowhere in Rule 36 or Rule 36.1 is there any language to 
suggest the two rules are different because one could be used 
to grant relief “from expired illegal sentences.” Similar to 
the language found in the original text of Rule 36.1, Rule 36 
stated that trial courts “may at any time correct clerical 
mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, 
and errors in the record arising from oversight or 
omission.” 176  This has been a long-standing rule in 
Tennessee 177  and is similar to prior Tennessee case law 
holding that “where a judgment is void then there is no 
judgment and consequently the [trial] court does not lose 
jurisdiction over the matter.”178 In light of this, there appears 
to be no textual reason to interpret the phrase “at any time” 
differently in Rule 36.1 from how the court treated the 
phrase in Rule 36. 
 In addition to its unique interpretation of the phrase 
“at any time,” the court in Brown also downplayed the 
differences between habeas corpus procedure and Rule 36.1. 
As previously stated, the pleading requirements in habeas 
corpus proceedings “are mandatory and must be followed 
scrupulously.” 179  To that end, petitioners seeking habeas 
corpus relief are required to state in their petitions that they 
                                                 
175 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 213 (emphasis in original). 
176 Compare TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36 (2013) (amended 2016), with TENN. 
R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) (2013) (amended 2016) (stating that either “the 
defendant or the state may seek to correct an illegal sentence . . . .”). 
177 See Bailey v. State, 280 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tenn. 1955) (noting that 
trial courts have the power “to correct every mistake apparent on the face 
of the record”); State v. Disney, 37 Tenn. 598, 601 (1858) (“[A]fter the 
record is made up, and the term [of court] closed, [the record] admits of 
no alteration, by the same court, unless for some mistake patent upon the 
face of the record, or proceedings in the case.”). 
178 State ex rel Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tenn. 1951). 
179 Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 165 (Tenn. 1993). 
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are “illegally restrained of liberty” and to attach a copy of 
the alleged void judgment “or a satisfactory reason given for 
its absence.” 180  Furthermore, the habeas corpus statutes 
provide a method of summary dismissal “[i]f, from the 
showing of the petitioner, the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to any relief, the writ may be refused . . . .”181 Put another 
way, “when a habeas corpus petition fails to establish that a 
judgment is void [upon the face of the judgment or record], 
a trial court may dismiss the petition without a hearing[]” or 
the appointment of counsel.182   
The original text of Rule 36.1, on the other hand, had 
no mechanism for summarily dismissing claims and allowed 
for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing if 
the motion merely stated “a colorable claim” and was not 
limited to proof on the face of the record. 183  These 
differences were in addition to the ones outlined by the court 
in Brown.184 To that end, the original text of Rule 36.1 was 
much more in line with the “liberal procedural 
safeguards” 185  of post-conviction proceedings, which, 
likewise, required the trial court to appoint counsel and hold 
an evidentiary hearing when a petition states a colorable 
claim.186 In fact, the court in Wooden actually adopted the 
definition of “colorable claim” used in the post-conviction 
context for use in Rule 36.1 proceedings.187 In light of this, 
the court’s interpretation of the plain language of Rule 36.1 
failed to construe the rule “in a way that is natural, ordinary, 
                                                 
180 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-21-107(b) (2012). 
181 Id. § 29-21-109. 
182 Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 260. 
183 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(b) (2013) (amended 2016); see also State v. 
Talley, No. E2014–01313–CCA–R3–CD 2014 WL 7366257, at *2 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2014). 
184 State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 209 (Tenn. 2015). 
185 Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007). 
186 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 28, §6(B). 
187 State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 592–93 (Tenn. 2015). 
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and unforced.” 188  In fact, court could only point to one 
similarity between a Rule 36.1 motion and a habeas corpus 
proceeding—the definition of “illegal sentence.”189     
V. Definition of Illegal Sentence 
 
 A key factor the court cited in Brown to support its 
conclusion that Rule 36.1 “was not . . . intended to expand 
the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims” was that Rule 
36.1 defined “‘illegal sentence’ exactly as [this] Court had 
already defined that term in the habeas corpus context.”190 
But, the court’s reasoning in this regard suffered from the 
same flaw as its reasoning regarding the jurisprudential 
context of Rule 36.1: it assumed that the definition of “illegal 
sentence” found in Rule 36.1 had exclusively been applied 
in “the habeas corpus context.” 191  However, a closer 
examination of that definition and its development in 
Tennessee case law proves that is not the case.  
 The original text of Rule 36.1 defined an “illegal 
sentence” as “one that [was] not authorized by the applicable 
statutes or that directly contravene[d] an applicable 
statute.”192 The Brown opinion refers to its companion case, 
Wooden, for the proposition that Rule 36.1’s definition of 
“illegal sentence” was “coextensive with, and actually 
mirror[s], the definition this Court has applied to that term in 
                                                 
188 Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 808 (Tenn. 2015). 
189 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 209. While not cited to in Brown, the language 
in subsection (c)(3) of Rule 36.1 dealing with illegal sentences when 
used as material components of a plea agreement is similar to language 
used in the court’s habeas corpus cases. See Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 
258–59. However, for a demonstration of the principle that a defendant 
can withdraw his guilty plea in such a situation pre-dating Moody and its 
progeny, see State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). 
190 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211. 
191 Id.  
192 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)(2) (2013) (amended 2016). 
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the habeas corpus context.”193 In Wooden, the court held that 
the definition of “illegal sentence” found in Rule 36.1 
“mirror[ed] [the one] adopted by this Court in [Cantrell v. 
Easterling] . . . .”194 In Cantrell, the court held that an illegal 
sentence was “one which [was] ‘in direct contravention of 
the express provisions of [an applicable statute], and 
consequently [is] a nullity.’” 195  The Cantrell court also 
added that it would “include within the rubric [of] ‘illegal 
sentences’ those sentences which [were] not authorized 
under the applicable statutory scheme.”196 In essence, the 
definition of “illegal sentence” found in Rule 36.1 and 
Cantrell concerns two types of sentences:  (1) sentences in 
direct contravention of an applicable statute and (2) 
sentences “not authorized by the applicable statutes.”197 
 In State v. Burkhart, the court defined an illegal 
sentence as one “in direct contravention of the express 
provisions of [an applicable statute] . . . .” and made no 
mention of sentences not authorized by the applicable 
statutes.198 However, in State v. Leathers, one of the cases 
cited by the court in Burkhart, the Oregon Supreme Court 
defined an “illegal sentence” as a sentence “beyond the 
bounds of [the trial court’s] sentencing authority . . . .” that 
would subsequently be “void for lack of authority and thus 
totally without legal effect.”199 Likewise, the court in State 
v. Mahler, a post-conviction case pre-dating Cantrell by over 
two decades, recognized the Burkhart definition of an illegal 
                                                 
193 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 209 (citing State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585 
(Tenn. 2015)). 
194 Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 594. 
195 Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2011) (alteration 
in original) (quoting State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 
1978)). 
196 Id. (citing Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2010)). 
197 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)(2) (2013) (amended 2016); Cantrell, 346 
S.W.3d at 452 (citing Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 759). 
198 Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). 
199 State v. Leathers, 531 P.2d 901, 903 (Or. 1975) (citations omitted). 
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sentence and that there had also been cases “where sentences 
were imposed which were higher or lower than that 
authorized by the statute designating the punishment for the 
crime.”200 The Mahler court determined that such sentences 
were “held subject to being later vacated or corrected.”201 
The court reaffirmed this principle in McConnell v. State, 
another post-conviction case.202 
 The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. 
Reliford cited McConnell for the proposition that a sentence, 
which “the trial court lacked the statutory authority to 
impose,” was an illegal sentence. 203   Reliford, which 
predated Cantrell by over a decade, involved a challenge to 
an illegal sentence brought in the trial court via a common 
law motion to correct an illegal sentence and subsequently 
brought to the intermediate appellate court via the common 
law writ of certiorari.204 McConnell was also cited by the 
Tennessee Supreme Court in Stephenson v. Carlton for the 
proposition that a sentence with “no statutory basis” was 
“illegal” and that a guilty plea agreement could not “salvage 
an illegal sentence or otherwise create authority for the 
imposition of a sentence that [had] not been authorized by 
statute.”205 Stephenson was cited by the Tennessee Supreme 
Court in Davis v. State for the proposition that trial courts 
lack jurisdiction to impose a sentence not authorized by the 
                                                 
200 State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987). 
201 Id. (citing State v. Hamlin, 655 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1983)). 
202 McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 799–800 (Tenn. 2000). 
203  State v. Reliford, NO. W1999-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 
1473846, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2000) (citing McConnell, 12 
S.W.3d at 795, 799–800). 
204 Id. 
205  Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tenn. 2000) (citing 
McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 799). 
35
et al.: Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1's New Clothes
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2017
Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
[68] 
applicable statutes.206 The Cantrell court then cited Davis 
when it articulated the two-part definition.207 
 The definition of “illegal sentence” in Cantrell and 
Rule 36.1 was not unique to the habeas corpus context, as 
the court suggested in Wooden and Brown.208 Rather, that 
definition had been used by Tennessee courts in examining 
illegal sentence claims in post-conviction proceedings, in 
proceedings utilizing the common law motion to correct an 
illegal sentence, and in habeas corpus proceedings. In fact, 
the only aspect of the Cantrell definition that differed from 
the original definition of an illegal sentence found in 
Burkhart was the inclusion of sentences not authorized by 
the applicable statute. However, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court first recognized those types of sentences as illegal in 
the post-conviction context (several years before Cantrell), 
not the habeas corpus context as asserted in Wooden and 
Brown.209 As such, the definition of “illegal sentence” found 
in Rule 36.1 was not a definition adopted solely from the 
“habeas corpus context” but, instead, was simply the 
definition of “illegal sentence” found generally in Tennessee 
law and applied across all the procedural vehicles used to 
challenge illegal sentences prior to Moody and Cantrell.210 
 
VI. Double Jeopardy and Rule 36.1 
 
 In addition to the text and jurisprudential context of 
Rule 36.1, the Brown court also said that interpreting Rule 
36.1 to allow for the correction of expired illegal sentences 
“could potentially produce absurd, and even arguably 
                                                 
206 Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2010). 
207 Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2010). 
208 State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015). 
209 See generally Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200; Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585. 
210 See generally Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200; Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585; 
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2010); Moody v. State, 
160 S.W. 3d 512 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 
1978).  
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unconstitutional results.” 211  Chiefly, the court stated that 
under such an interpretation of Rule 36.1 “the State would 
be entitled to correct an illegally lenient sentence, even after 
the sentence had been fully served.”212  The Brown court 
imagined that “[a] defendant faced with the prospect of 
returning to prison after already serving his sentence would 
undoubtedly raise many objections . . . including 
constitutional objections[,]”213 and that “the ‘outcry’ would 
be unimaginable were ‘the State [to] start using Rule 36.1 to 
jail untold numbers of citizens that by all indications have 
completely served their sentences . . . .’”214 The court stated 
that it would not interpret Rule 36.1 to allow for the 
correction of expired illegal sentences because such an 
interpretation had “the potential to result in unconstitutional 
applications” of the rule.215 
 There are several problems with the Brown court’s 
analysis with respect to the danger of Rule 36.1 being 
applied unconstitutionally. First, to the extent that the court 
differentiated between illegally lenient sentences and other 
illegal sentences in Brown, its reasoning was in direct 
contravention of the court’s prior holding that a trial court 
“lacks jurisdiction to impose an agreed sentence that is 
illegal, even an illegally lenient one.”216 Put another way, an 
illegally lenient sentence is just as void as any other type of 
illegal sentence. Additionally, the question of whether a 
government’s attempt to correct an expired illegally lenient 
sentence would violate constitutional protections against 
double jeopardy is not as straightforward as the court 
                                                 
211 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211. 
212 Id. (emphasis in original). 
213 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Selavka, 14 N.E.3d 933, 941 (Mass. 
2014)). 
214 Id. (quoting Lee v. State, 2015 WL 2330063, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
May 13, 2015) (Williams, J., dissenting)) (alterations in original). 
215 Id. 
216  Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tenn. 2007) (citing 
McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tenn. 2000)). 
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presented it in Brown. 217  Admittedly, at least one 
jurisdiction has issued a blanket pronouncement that such an 
action would violate double jeopardy protections. 218 
However, other jurisdictions have taken a more nuanced 
view of the issue, noting that the issue requires the weighing 
of a defendant’s interest in finality of the sentence against a 
state’s interest in the correction of the illegality 219  and, 
moreover, that the passage of time is a key factor in 
determining whether a defendant has a legitimate 
expectation of finality in an illegal sentence.220 Further still, 
at least one jurisdiction has concluded that despite a sentence 
being already served by a defendant, a “[d]efendant [cannot] 
have a legitimate expectation of finality in the severity of the 
original sentence because it was illegally lenient . . . .”221 
                                                 
217 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.  
218 See State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) 
(quoting Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)) 
(stating that “where a sentence has already been served, even if it is an 
illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased 
sentence”). 
219 See State v. Trieb, 533 N.W.2d 678, 681 (N.D. 1995) (citing United 
States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1992); DeWitt v. 
Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1993)) (noting that a defendant 
“cannot acquire a legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence which 
is illegal, because such a sentence remains subject to modification” but 
recognizing that in some cases correction could be “so unfair that it must 
be deemed inconsistent with fundamental notions of fairness” and 
providing a balancing test). 
220 Commonwealth v. Selavka, 14 N.E.3d 933, 941, 944 (Mass. 2014) 
(emphasis added) (recognizing that “a defendant’s legitimate 
expectation of finality may well be diminished when his sentence is 
illegal” but concluding that “even an illegal sentence, with the passage 
of time, acquire[s] a finality that bars further punitive changes 
detrimental to the defendant”). 
221 People v. Thompson, NO. 4609/99, 2009 WL 348370, at *3, *5 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 2009) (also noting that the defendant’s “expectation of 
finality” was further “undermined by the additional legal circumstance 
that New York courts have the inherent power to correct an illegal 
sentence”). 
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 The question of whether the State could seek to 
correct an expired, illegally lenient sentence, however, was 
not dispositive to the claim at issue in Brown. The motion to 
correct an illegal sentence at issue in Brown had been 
brought by Mr. Brown, not the State.222 It is well established 
that “[w]hen the accused himself procures a judgment to be 
set aside upon his own initiative and he voluntarily accepts 
the result, then he cannot by his own act avoid the jeopardy 
in which he stands and then assert it as a bar to a subsequent 
jeopardy.”223 As such, the question of whether use of Rule 
36.1 by the State to correct an expired, illegally lenient 
sentence was not before the court and, therefore, not 
necessary for the determination of Mr. Brown’s case. 
Accordingly, the court should not have considered in its 
analysis the possible “constitutional objections” of a 
theoretical defendant in that situation.224 Ultimately, there 
was no constitutional impediment to Mr. Brown’s argument 
that he could use Rule 36.1 to correct his expired illegally 
lenient sentences. 
 
VII. Mootness 
 
 Prior to the court’s decision in Brown, a panel of the 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the 
expiration of Mr. Brown’s sentences rendered his motion to 
correct them moot. 225  Citing the mootness doctrine, the 
                                                 
222 State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 202 (Tenn. 2015). 
223 State v. Clemons, 873 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting 
State v. Collins, 698 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985)). 
224 Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (observing that 
“under Tennessee law, courts do not decide constitutional questions 
unless resolution is absolutely necessary for determination of the case 
and the rights of the parties” and that “courts should avoid deciding 
constitutional issues” if “a case can be resolved on non-constitutional 
grounds”). 
225 State v. Brown, NO. E2014-00673-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 5483011, 
at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2014). 
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panel concluded that Mr. Brown’s motion to correct his 
expired illegal sentences failed to present a “live 
controversy” and that the case could “no longer provide 
relief” to Mr. Brown.226 To support this reasoning, the panel 
cited to cases from other jurisdictions that had “concluded 
that a challenge to the legality of a sentence [became] moot 
once the sentence [had] been served.”227 However, the cases 
to which the panel’s decision referred cited little to no 
authority to support this reasoning. 228  One of the cases 
contained a vigorous dissent, which noted that even after a 
sentence is served the sentence “still exists” unless it has 
been expunged and that there are “[a] countless number of 
situations [that] occur where a prison sentence has collateral 
consequences[]” that can plague a defendant in the future.229 
 Despite the fact that the Tennessee Supreme Court 
had previously referred to an expired illegal sentence claim 
brought in a habeas corpus proceeding as moot,230 the court 
in Brown 231  rejected the mootness argument of the 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The court noted that 
the question of whether a defendant was imprisoned or 
restrained of liberty was a “separate and distinct” question 
from the issue of whether a “challenged conviction’s 
                                                 
226 Id. at *5–6. 
227 Id. at *6 (citing State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2012); Barnes v. State, 31 A.3d 203, 207 (Md. 2011); Sanchez v. State, 
982 P.2d 149, 150–51 (Wyo. 1999)). 
228  See Barnes, 31 A.3d at 210 (citing only Sanchez to support its 
reasoning); Sanchez, 982 P.2d at 150–51 (citing no authority to support 
its conclusion). Additionally, the rules in all of these other jurisdictions, 
unlike Rule 36.1, did not provide a method to attack a defendant’s 
underlying conviction. See MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 4-345(a) 
(West 1984); WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 35; FLA. R. CRIM. P. RULE 3.800. 
229 Barnes, 31 A.3d at 212 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). 
230 See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 257–58 (Tenn. 2007) (stating 
that the court would have accepted the State’s argument that the 
defendant’s illegal sentence claim was moot if the defendant had fully 
served his total effective sentence). 
231 Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211 n.12. 
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collateral consequences [could] prevent . . . [it] from 
becoming moot.”232 The court concluded that “[c]ollateral 
consequences [could] prevent a case from becoming moot in 
the traditional sense of the mootness doctrine” but that Rule 
36.1, in light of the opinion’s interpretation of the rule, was 
“not an appropriate avenue for seeking relief from collateral 
consequences.”233 While this article has laid out a strong 
case against the court’s view that Rule 36.1 was not an 
appropriate vehicle for challenging the collateral 
consequences of an expired illegal sentence, I agree with the 
court’s reasoning regarding the inapplicability of the 
mootness doctrine to expired illegal sentence claims.  
 The court has stated in the past that showing a 
defendant is imprisoned or restrained of liberty is “[a] 
statutory prerequisite for eligibility to seek habeas corpus 
relief . . . .”234 Further, the court has declined to include 
restraints on a defendant’s liberty that it deemed “merely a 
collateral consequence of the challenged judgment” as 
cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding.235  As previously 
discussed, the court has also held that an expired sentence 
may be challenged in a post-conviction proceeding.236 In so 
holding, the court stated that “a criminal case is moot only if 
it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal 
consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged 
conviction.”237 As noted by the dissenting opinion in Barnes 
and the Tennessee Supreme Court in McCraw, there are 
numerous possible collateral consequences that flow from an 
expired illegal sentence. As such, the mootness doctrine 
would not apply to bar expired illegal sentence claims under 
Rule 36.1. 
                                                 
232 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting May v. Carlton, 245 
S.W.3d 340, 356 n.22 (Koch, J., dissenting)). 
233 Id. 
234 Benson v. State, 153 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Tenn. 2004). 
235 Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tenn. 2004). 
236 See, e.g., State v. McCraw, 551 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1977). 
237 Id. (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1965)). 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
 In Brown, the Tennessee Supreme Court overlooked 
a significant portion of the “jurisprudential context” from 
which Rule 36.1 originated, interpreted the plain language of 
Rule 36.1 in a way that was not “natural, ordinary, and 
unforced,”238 and unnecessarily raised a constitutional issue 
that had not been presented for the court’s review. The court 
based its reasoning upon the assumption that because of its 
opinion in Moody, habeas corpus was the sole procedural 
vehicle for challenging an illegal sentence and Rule 36.1 
thereby implicitly incorporated the habeas corpus statutes’ 
procedural ban on challenging expired illegal sentences. 
This reasoning overlooked the fact that the court had 
repeatedly stated that some illegal sentences could be 
challenged in a post-conviction proceeding, a proceeding 
that has long been held to allow for challenges to expired 
sentences. Furthermore, the court’s interpretation of the 
plain language of Rule 36.1 discounted the fact that the rule 
more closely resembled a post-conviction proceeding, rather 
than a habeas corpus proceeding. Likewise, the one portion 
of Rule 36.1 the court cited as being identical to habeas 
corpus case law, the definition of the term “illegal sentence,” 
actually predated Moody and has been used by courts outside 
the habeas corpus context. Additionally, the court’s 
constitutional concerns and the doctrine of mootness both 
proved to be irrelevant to the issues presented in Brown. All 
of this leads to the conclusion that the court erred in 
interpreting Rule 36.1 to not allow for the correction of 
expired illegal sentences. 
Nevertheless, Brown and its companion case 
Wooden will likely be mere footnotes in Tennessee’s 
jurisprudential history. On December 29, 2015, roughly four 
weeks after Brown and Wooden were filed, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court entered an order that replaced the original 
                                                 
238 Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 808 (Tenn. 2015). 
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text of Rule 36.1 in its entirety, effective July 1, 2016.239 The 
order removed the phrase “at any time” from Rule 36.1 and 
replaced it with a requirement that, except for one narrow 
exception, the motion “must be filed before the sentence set 
forth in the judgment order expires.” 240  Rule 36.1 now 
requires the moving party to include “a copy of the relevant 
judgment order(s)” with the motion, allows the movant to 
include “other supporting documents,” and requires the 
movant “to state whether the motion is the first motion to 
correct the illegal sentence.” 241  The new Advisory 
Commission Comment to Rule 36.1 states that the rule’s 
definition of “illegal sentence” “incorporates the definition . 
. . set forth in Cantrell.”242 The new version of Rule 36.1 also 
permits summary denial of motions that do not set forth a 
colorable claim.243 
 The new Rule 36.1 also “limit[s] the circumstances 
under which relief may be granted where the defendant has 
entered into a plea bargain which contains an illegal 
sentence.”244 Trial courts are now required to deny motions 
when the defendant has “benefitted from the bargained-for 
illegal sentence.” 245  As an example, the new Advisory 
Commission Comment states that when a defendant has 
received illegal concurrent sentences, that defendant cannot 
bring a motion to correct the illegal sentences.246 Rule 36.1 
additionally provides, in new subsection (d), a narrow 
exception to the rule’s prohibition on challenging expired 
illegal sentences.247 Subsection (d) allows the State “to seek 
                                                 
239 Order Amending the Rules of Criminal Procedure, No. ADM2015-
01631 (filed Dec. 29, 2015). 
240 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)(1) (2016). 
241 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) cmt. (ADVISORY COMM’N 2016). 
242 Id. 
243 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(b)(2) (2016). 
244 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2016) (ADVISORY COMM’N 2016). 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(d) (2016). 
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to correct a judgment order that failed to impose a statutorily 
required sentence of lifetime community supervision” if the 
motion is “filed no later than ninety days after the sentence 
imposed in the judgment order expires.”248 
 In essence, the amendment to Rule 36.1 wiped out 
the original version and replaced it with a new version 
explicitly in line with the court’s interpretation of the 
original Rule 36.1 in Brown and Wooden.249 The amendment 
to Rule 36.1 replaced the liberal procedural safeguards, 
similar to those of post-conviction proceedings found in the 
original text of the rule, with more stringent procedural 
requirements reminiscent of those found in habeas corpus 
proceedings. Also, the addition of subsection (d) is 
interesting, given the court’s statements in Brown allowing 
for the correction of expired illegal sentences that “could 
potentially produce absurd” results. These additions are 
especially interesting in light of the court’s concern that 
allowing the State to correct expired sentences had “the 
potential to result in unconstitutional applications” of the 
rule.250 Based on the court’s reasoning in Brown, any use by 
the State of subsection (d) would be open to an obvious 
constitutional challenge on double jeopardy grounds.  
Also troubling is the new Rule 36.1’s language 
regarding defendants’ having “benefitted from the 
bargained-for illegal sentence.” This portion of the new rule 
seemingly ignores the precedent that a trial court “lacks 
jurisdiction to impose an agreed sentence that is illegal, even 
                                                 
248 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(d) (2016); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(d) cmt. 
(ADVISORY COMM’N 2016) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-524 
(2014)). 
249 “The [Tennessee] [S]upreme [C]ourt has the power to prescribe by 
general rules the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the 
practice and procedure in all of the courts of [Tennessee] in all civil and 
criminal suits, actions and proceedings.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-402 
(2009). 
250 State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015). 
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an illegally lenient one.”251 Additionally, while it is true that 
these defendants may have served shorter sentences on the 
front end, most of the defendants challenging illegal 
sentences under Rule 36.1 were incarcerated in state or 
federal prison, and their new sentences were enhanced by 
prior convictions infected with the challenged illegal 
sentence. It is hard to imagine that a defendant “benefits” 
from continuing to be exposed to such a collateral 
consequence. Moreover, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
adopted the amendments to Rule 36.1 without much thought 
to these issues or the shortcomings of the Brown and Wooden 
decisions. Perhaps, after the issuance of the Brown and 
Wooden opinions, the court was reminded of the ancient 
maxim, “[b]lessed be the amending hand.”252 
 
                                                 
251 Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tenn. 2007). 
252 EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW 
OF ENGLAND 366 (4th ed., London, A. Crooke et al. 1669) (1644). 
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